On
December 7th 2006, Ownit Mortgage Solutions Inc., a California based
home lender part owned by Merril Lynch and Co., closed its doors and told more
than 800 workers not to return just days before Christmas. The collapse of
this wholesale mortgage lender, 11th largest United States (US)
issuer of subprime mortgages, marked the beginning of the global financial
crisis (GFC) which would later turn out the largest global economic downturn
not seen since the great depression.
In the United Kingdom (UK), the
Northern Rock was the first high profile victim of the crisis as it was forced
to apply to the Bank of England for emergency financial support on 13thSeptember
2007 (Hoson and Quaglia, 2009) after it became the first run on a British bank
since 1866 (Hodson and Mabbett, 2009).
More than four years into the
crisis, the global financial system still remains in turmoil and recent data
has shown a renewed slowing down of the global economy US first quarter 2012
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) dropped to 2.2% from 3% seen in the last quarter
of 2011 and below projected estimates of 2.5%. News of China’s first quarter
GDP result was not better as the economy grew at 8.1%, the slowest in more than
three years. The report from the Office
of National Statistics in the UK were even gloomier as GDP contracted by
0.2% in the first quarter of 2012, putting the economy back in recession and
compared to the Great Depression of the 1930’s, the weakest recovery from any
financial crisis in modern history.
Causes of Global Financial Crisis
The
factors that led to the GFC are varied and complex Acharya and Richardson
(2009) noted the fundamental causes of the crisis was the combination of a
credit boom and the housing bubble.
In
attempting to examine the factors we use the findings identified by the US
government appointed Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission as our template.
a) Behaviour
of Large Complex Financial Institutions (LCFI)
Diamond
(1984) noted that the simple theory of banks was to act as intermediaries between depositors and borrowers, and in order to
protect depositors from losses banks were required to hold a minimum amount
of“Capital” which is defined by regulators. Under the Basel accord, banks must
maintain 8% capital buffer against risk adjusted measures of their assets and
in the US 10% capital buffer was designated to “well capitalized banks”. In an
attempt to circumvent this capital adequacy requirement the LCFI turned to
securitization,which
is the pooling together various
types of contractual debt (e.g. mortgages) and selling them as standard
securities. This allowed the banks to avoid holding costly capital
by turning them into underwriters that still originate the loan but sell them
off to others (Acharya and Richardson, 2009). This behaviour of banks altered
the original idea of banking; banks are now intermediaries
between investors (rather than just
depositors) and borrowers.
The
process of securitization allowed the banks to reduce their reliance on
deposits and obtain funding for their loans through the capital markets by
using asset-backed securities (ABS) that could be sold to investors (Wilmarth, 2009). The ABS were created
from pool of mortgages and sold in tranches called Collateralised Debt
Obligations (CDOs). The tranches were accorded different ratings and the
ratings were supposed to be based on the riskiness of the debts. Another
benefit of securitization was that it offered banks with less than a “AAA” to
create ABS that qualified for “AAA” ratings, while also earning sustainable
fees for originating and securitising loans.
The
period 2002 to 2007 saw a staggering increase in structured securities as banks
extended the prime-mortgage securitisation model to other riskier asset
classes. This allowed banks to transfer risk from the balance sheet to the broader
capital market including pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies and
foreign based institutions (Financial
Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011). With the loans placed in conduits
rather than on the banks’ balance sheet, the banks did not need to maintain
capital against them and these conduits funded asset backed securities through
asset-backed commercial papers (ABCP). Conduits are entities set up by the
financial institutions to enable then more easily sell their loans to investors
in the secondary market; they are also known as special purpose vehicles. To be
able to sell the ABCP, the bank would have to provide the buyers with guarantee
of underlying credit – essentially bringing the risk back onto itself. The
aggregate securitization worldwide went up from $767 billion at the end of 2001
to $1.4 trillion in 2004 and by 2006 (at the peak of the bubble) had reached
$2.7 trillion (Acharya and Richardson, 2009).
During
the period preceding the crisis, conglomerates significantly expanded their
presence in the securitization market as Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns were
the top underwriters for residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) during
2004 to 2007, while Citigroup was the top underwriter for ABS backed by other
types of consumer debt (Wilmarth, 2009).
Financial
conglomerates aggravated the risks of nonprime mortgages by creating multiple
financial bets based on those mortgages. LCFIs re-securitized lower-rated
tranches of RMBS to create Collateral Debt Obligations (CDOs), and then
re-securitized lower-rated tranches of CDOs to create CDOs-squared. Some of
these tranches were then rated again and some were given “AAA” ratings, thus
adding to the risk and complexity of the debt instruments. LCFIs also created
synthetic CDOs and wrote Credit default Swaps (CDS) to create additional
financial bets. One of the major problems
with CDS is that CDS can be purchased without having an underlying security.
Goldman Sachs played a major role in the trading of CDS. By the end of 2007,
outstanding CDS amounted to $62.2 trillion (Wilmarth, 2009).
When the
collapse occurred the ABCP could not be rolled over and the banks had to return
the loans to their balance sheets which effectively wiped out significant bank
capital and thereafter the bank solvency. The chart below shows movement in
securitisation in the UK between 2000 and 2009.
b) Widespread
failure in financial regulation and supervision
The
scenario highlighted previously was able to take place because of what FCIC
succinctly described as “the sentries were not at their post, in small part due
to the widely accepted faith in self-correcting nature of markets and the
ability of financial institutions to effectively police themselves” (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011).
After
more than fifty years without a financial crisis, financial firms and policy
makers began to see regulation as a barrier to efficient functioning of capital
markets rather than a necessary precondition for success (Congressional Oversight Panel, 2009).
The change in attitude resulted in more than 30 years of deregulation and
reliance on self-regulation championed by Alan Greenspan, the former Federal
Reserve chairman (Financial Crisis
Inquiry Commission, 2011). This hands-off approach gave rise to a nearly
unrestricted marketing of increasing complex consumer financial products which
was even poorly understood by the regulators. The net effect was the failure to
effectively manage risk as well as ensure transparency and fair dealings in
financial transactions, all culminating volatile practices by the financial
industry that led to the global crisis.
The
United States special report on regulatory reform (2009) noted that markets
have become opaque in multiple ways as some markets such as hedge funds and
credit default swaps, provide virtually no information, while off balance sheet
entities and complex financial instruments reveal the lack of transparency
resulting from wrong information disclosed at the wrong time and in the wrong
manner. Mortgage documentation was also highlighted as problematic as borrowers
were intentionally thrust with reams of technically worded contact too
difficult for them to understand the complexity. The panel identified eight
specific areas most urgently in need of reform.
Identify and regulate financial institutions that pose systematic risk.
Limit excessive leverage in American financial institutions.
Increase supervision of the shadow financial system.
Create a new system of
state regulation of mortgages and other consumer credit products.
Create executive pay
structures that discourage excessive risk taking.
Reform the credit
rating system.
Make establishing a
global financial regulatory floor a US diplomatic priority.
Plan for the next
crisis.
TheDodd-Frank Wall
street reform and consumer protection act was passed by the US congress and
signed into law by president Barack Obama on July 21 2010, in response to the
loop holes that led to the global financial crisis with the aim of “creating
sound economic foundation to grow jobs, protect consumers, rein in Wall street
and big bonuses, end bailouts and prevent another financial crisis (Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform And Consumer
Protection Act, 2010).
c) An unsustainable
Credit Boom
The United States
experienced an enormous credit boom between 1991 and 2007 as credit markets
owned by all sectors tripled from $1.4trillion in 1991 to $46.9 trillion in
2007 (Wilmarth, 2009), while
non-governmental domestic debts quadrupled and rose by $29.6 trillion
accounting for ninety percent of the overall growth. In the UK similar picture
was observed and this resulted in a sharp increase in household debt and
disposable income.
The credit boom was
facilitated by a combination of low interest rates and large inflows of foreign
funds with net increase in availability of credit to higher-risk consumers and
commercial real estate developers (Wilmarth,
2009).The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission noted that many mortgage
lenders exploited the availability of cheap funds and set the bar so low that
lenders took eager borrowers qualification on faith, often with wilful
disregard for the borrower’s ability to pay (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011). When these borrowers
stopped making mortgage payments, the losses – amplified by derivatives –
rushed through the pipeline, and as it turned out, these losses were
concentrated in a set of systematically important financial institutions that
kicked off the global financial crisis.
d) Poor Credit
Rating
The FCIC indicted the
credit rating agencies as key enablers of the financial meltdown as the
mortgage-related securities at the heart of the crisis could not be sold
without their seal of approval (Financial
Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011). Investors relied on their approval and
in some cases were obligated to use these rating agencies. Their ratings helped
the market soar and their downgrades through 2007 and 2008 wreaked havocs
across markets and firms. FCIC identified flawed computer models, pressure from
financial firms that paid for the ratings, relentless drive for market share,
lack of resources and absence of meaningful public oversight as reasons for
rating agencies in-appropriately awarding AAA-ratings to securities that were
ultimately downgraded.
e) Systemic
Breakdown in Accountability and Ethics
The soundness and the
sustained prosperity of the financial system and the economy rely on notions of
fair dealing, responsibility and transparency. But a close examination of the
actions of financial institutions in the periods prior to financial crisis
revealed a systematic lack of accountability and a relaxation of ethical
standards. The FCIC (2009) catalogues the rising incidence of mortgage fraud,
which flourished in an environment of collapsing lending standards and lax
regulation. Reviews by the FCIC (2009) showed that the percentage of borrowers
who defaulted on their mortgages within just a matter of months doubled from
the summer of 2006 to 2007 indicating that they likely took out mortgages they
never had the capacity or intention to pay. The report summarises that the
crisis was as a result of human mistakes, misjudgements and misdeeds that
resulted in systematic failure of the financial industry.
Effects on the UK
Economy
The UK economy has been hit hard by the financial
crisis with early casualties being the first run on a British bank since 1866
and a near melt down in the banking system afterwards. Business in the UK have
since struggled to stay afloat but the economic news keeps tracking in the
wrong direction despite the government’s effort to spur economic growth while
also attempting to control the deficit. The UK economy which is the 7th
largest in the world as measured by GDP (International Monetary Fund, 2012)
officially entered a recession in the second quarter of 2008 according to the
Office of National Statistics (ONS) and exited it in the 4th quarter
of 2009, only to enter a double dip recession in the first quarter of 2012 (Office for National Statistics, 2012).
The graph below shows UK GDP growth rate from 2006 to 2011.
As of the end of November 2009 the UK economy had shrunk
4.9% from the pre-recession level with the ONS reporting that in the 3rd
quarter of 2009, the economy experienced a 0.2% negative growth compared to
0.6% fall experienced in the previous quarter with further improvements seen in
the third quarter of 2010 as the economy grew by 0.8%, the fastest third
quarter growth in 10 years. But the positive news was short lived as by the
fourth quarter of 2010 the economy had shrunk 0.5% with mixed results seen
in 2011 and by the 4th quarter of 2011 the economy shrunk by 0.3%
culminating in a double dip recession in the first quarter of 2012 after a
decline in GDP of 0.2% (Office for National Statistics, 2012).
The effects can also be seen in the unemployment
figures which have been very disappointing. When the GFC hit, the unemployment
rate was a little over 5.6% (1.6 million people). By the end of 2009 it was almost
8.5% (about 2.5 million people unemployed), and by the end of 2011, 2.7 million
people were unemployed, the highest in more than 17 years. At the
individual level, about 13.5 million people in the UK are currently living in
households below the low income threshold representing an 11% increase compared
to 2004/2005.The UK manufacturing sector also suffered a big blow from the
recession. According to the Markit Purchasing Managers Index (MPI), this
surveys business conditions, dipped
to 50.5 in April 2012 down from 51.9 in March, raising fears of the weakness of
the sector. The ONS notes that even though the manufacturing sector
recovered following the recession, it returned to contraction in June 2011 with
overall manufacturing output down by 2% as at April 2012 when compared to this
period (Office of National Statistics, 2012).
Following the recession in 2008, bank lending to
small businesses dropped significantly, but in the last 12 months, compared
2009 and 2010, it has improved significantly only to drop 10.9% in March 2012,
down from 11.7% figure reported in February 2012. Small bank lending remains
flat at a 47.6% approval rate, alternate lenders picked up slightly (0.5%) to a
63% approval rate and loans made by credit unions barely increased (up 0.1%) to
a 57.9% approval rate by March 2012 (Arora, 2012). Under project Merlin, banks
agreed with the government to increase lending to SMEs to £76bn, an increase
from £10billion compared to 2010, however the first quarterly lending data
report of 2011 showed that five banks lent £16.8billion instead of the targeted
£19 billion per quarter (Broughton, 2012). The chart below shows reduction in
lending to small and medium scale enterprises in the UK between 2008 and 2011.
Financial Institutions are becoming even more cautious in their lending
particularly with the not so rosy economic outlook (Arora, 2012).
Conclusion
The issues highlighted above were some of the major
activities that led to the financial crisis and the effect is still being felt
worldwide today. The UK economy has experienced negative growth in GDP as
various sectors of the economy have been affected by the GFC, also it is
becoming more difficult for businesses to access funding to grow their business
as a result of reduced lending by financial institutions.
In order to overcome the financial crisis it is
imperative that a long-term, non-ideological realistic approach be adopted by
all governments else we might see the global economy slide into a double-dip
recession.
References
Acharya, V. V. and Richardson, M. (2009). Causes of
the Financial Crisis. Critical Review Foundation. vol 21(2-3). pp 195-210.
Broughton,
N. (2012). Lending to Business. Economic Policy and Statistics. January.
Congressional Oversight Panel (2009). Special Report
on Regulatory Reform. 125(b)(2) Title 1, Emergency Economic Stabilisation Act.
Pub. L. No. 110-343.
Diamond,
D. (1984). “Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring.” Review of Economic Studies 51:
393–414.
Financial
Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011). Final
Report Of The National Commission On The Causes Of The Financial And Economic
Crisis In The United States.
Hodson,
D. and Mabbett, D. (2009). UK Economic Policy and the Global Financial Crisis:
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D. and Quaglia, L. (2009). European Perspectives on the Global Financial
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Wilmarth, A. E. (2009). The Dark Side of Universal
Banking: Financial Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial
Crisis. Connecticut Law Review. May. Vol. 41.4.